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This paper is concerned with the Hahn problem in a general mone-
tary equilibrium model at the terminal period. Under the assumption
that an initial endowment allocation is not Pareto optimal it is proved
that an equilibrium with a positive value of money exists if traders take
buying and selling prices of commodities as given even if transactions
costs are not explicitly required in the buying and selling activities of
traders in commodity markets.
This result seems to suggest two interpretations. One is that a
standard monetary equilibrium concept must be strengthened so as
to explicitly require an arbitrage-free property of bid-ask spreads of
commodity prices vis-` a-vis transactions costs. The second interpreta-
tion is that a model in which traders take distinct buying and selling
prices as given although no transactions costs are required can be
thought of as a way to make tax payments required by an external
authority in classical papers endogenous in the form of an indirect
taxation.
∗An earlier version of this paper was circulated as “On the Terminal Value of Money
without Transactions Costs”, RUEE Working Paper #91-44, Department of Economics,
Hitotsubashi University, October, 1991.
†Iw ould like to thank an anonymous referee for his/her useful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
11I n troduction
This paper is concerned with the Hahn problem in a general monetary equi-
librium model at the terminal period1 (see Hahn (1965) and Duﬃe (1990)).
Under the assumption that an initial endowments allocation is not Pareto
optimal it is proved that an equilibrium with a positive value of money exists
if traders take buying and selling prices of commodities as given even if trans-
actions costs are not explicitly required in the buying and selling activities
of transactions in commodity markets.
When one introduces pure outside ﬁat money into a standard general
equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie-Nikaido (ADMN), the fact
that an equilibrium exists in the original ADMN model implies that there
always exists an equilibrium in which the value of money is zero. But, of
course, unless money receives positive valuation in markets, it is impossible
to play a basic role as a means of payment. This is the well-known “Hahn
problem” in a general monetary equilibrium model pointed out by Hahn
(1965). In a series of eﬀorts to solve the problem in 1970’s, traders are either
simply forced to hold the positive amount of money or motivated to such
holdings by required tax payments in the terminal period. (See, e.g., Starr
(1974), Kurz (1974a, 1974b), Heller (1974), Okuno (1973), etc.) The reason
for such a requirement is that ﬁat money has no apparent purchasing power
in the last period so that traders have no incentives to hold money.
Duﬃe (1990) in his contribution to this problem has speciﬁcally taken
up the problem of terminal value of money. In the setting of an ADMN
model with outside ﬁat money and transactions costs expressed by individual
transactions possibility sets as in Kurz (1974b) and Heller (1974), he showed
that an equilibrium with the positive terminal value of money exists if traders
take buying and selling prices in markets as given provided that they have
incentives to trade (that is, the initial endowments allocation is not Pareto
optimal). Traders are thought to face distinct buying and selling prices
due to transactions costs as in a market transactions costs’ model of Foley
(1970). Duﬃe’s basic idea is that accounting identity forces the total value of
purchases to exceed the total value of sales by the amount of outside money
if traders are to use the money balances in their transactions at the terminal
period.
1The “Hahn problem” addresses the issue of whether there exists an equilibrium in
which the value of money is positive.
2An equilibrium is composed of buying prices, selling prices, and preference-
maximizing transactions in traders’ budgets given these prices such that the
total amount of each commodity (or money) bought does not exceed the
total amount of each commodity (or money) sold. This equilibrium con-
cept was introduced by Foley (1970) and Hahn (1971), and others such as
Kurz (1974a, 1974b), Starrett (1973), Hayashi (1974), Okuno (1974), Duﬃe
(1990), etc. worked with this deﬁnition. In the present paper we employ an
exchange economy version of a standard ADMN model as in Duﬃe (1990)
but without explicitly introducing transactions costs in the form of individual
transactions possibility sets as is done in his paper as well as in the works of
Kurz (1974b) and Heller (1974). The model describes the terminal period of
a ﬁnite sequence economy. We work with the above equilibrium concept. An
existence theorem presented conﬁrms a conjecture of Duﬃe (1990) that his
existence theorem does not seem to rely on the requirement of transactions
costs.
Did something go wrong in the setting of transactions costs models? Or,
how should we interpret the implication of the result obtained in this paper?
There seem to be two possible interpretations. One interpretation is that
the equilibrium concept needs to be strengthened so that bid-ask spreads
of buying and selling prices do satisfy an arbitrage-free condition deﬁned
in an appropriate way vis-` a-vis explicitly introduced transactions costs. The
second interpretation is to regard bid-ask spreads as representing endogenous
indirect taxation. The latter interpretation may be of interest as writers
such as Lerner (1947), Starr (1974), Kurz (1974b) and others thought that
it is necessary to require that terminal money be used for tax purposes to
force traders to demand the terminal money. The formulation of taxes by
distinct buying and selling prices without transactions costs do endogenize
this taxation.
Finally, let us note that the deﬁnition of an equilibrium given above pre-
supposes the free disposability of commodities. By allowing negative buying
and selling prices, we do not assume the free disposability. The sign of a bid-
ask spread then depends on the sign of a buying price (see Section 3 on this).
We exploit the proof technique of Bergstrom (1976) and Shafer-Sonnenschein
(1975) together with the idea of Duﬃe (1990).
32 The Model
Consumption Characteristics of Agents
The commodity space is R .F or simplicity consumption sets are taken to
be R 
+. Preference relations  ⊂R 
+ × R 
+ are relatively open, irreﬂexive,
locally nonsatiated, and convex (i.e., the set {z ∈ R 
+ | z   x } is convex for
each x ∈ R 
+).
There are m agents. Each agent i ∈{ 1,...,m} is characterized by a
preference relation  i, initial endowments ei ∈ R 
+, and an endowment of
money Mi ≥ 0.
Market Transactions
Buying and selling are separate transaction activities which command diﬀer-
ent price systems. All the prices are expressed in terms of the unit of account.
pB ∈ R  and pS ∈ R  denote buying and selling prices respectively. Some of
the prices may be negative. We express a pair composed of buying prices pB
and “reverse-signed” selling prices −pS by p := (pB,−pS). p represents a vec-
tor of prices to be paid for a unit of purchases or sales of commodities in the
market. A basic assumption is that each agent takes both buying and selling
prices in markets as given and determines its transaction of commodities.
Means of Payment
Means of payment are ﬁat money the amount M =
 m
i=1 Mi > 0o fwhich
is ﬁxed exogenously. It is implicitly assumed that a public authority is set
up for coordinating market transactions and collecting money for its service




i (∈ R 
+) represent purchases and sales of   commodities by agent
i in the markets. Write xi := (xB
i ,x S
i ) ∈ R 
+ × R 
+. The transaction of xi by
agent i leaves the consumption vector xC
i := xB
i − xS
i + ei for i.I ti sbudget
feasible for i at buying and selling prices p =( pB,−pS) ∈ R2  if xC
i ≥ 0 and
p · xi ≤ Mi. When agent i engages in market transactions xi,h ereceives
pS · xS
i in money and spends at most pB · xB
i + Mi. Or, one can think of the
4above budget inequality as allowing netting between obligations and claims
before the payment of money is made to the market authority.
A budget feasible transaction xi is a preference maximizer for i provided
yC
i   i xC
i for any budget feasible transaction yi for i.
Allocations and Monetary Equilibrium
A m-tuple of transaction vectors (x1,...,x m)i satransaction allocation if
xi ∈ R2 
+ and xC
i ∈ R 
+ for every i =1 ,...,m.( xC
1 ,...,x C
m)i scalled the





i . Note that the feasibility of a transaction allocation





i=1ei of the associated
consumption allocation (xC
1 ,...,x C
m), which is more familiar.
Given two transaction allocations (x1,...,x m) and (y1,...,y m),(x1,...,x m)
is said to Pareto improve (y1,...,y m)i fxC
i  i yC
i for every agent i. (This
requirement of improvement is stronger than the usual one unless preferences
satisfy monotonicity.) A feasible transaction allocation (x1,...,x m)i sPareto
optimal if no other feasible transaction allocations can Pareto improve it.
A monetary equilibrium for the economy ( i,e i,M i)i=1,...,m is a collection
((x1,...,x m),p) ∈ (R2 )m×R2  such that, given prices pB,p S, the transaction
xi is budget feasible and a preference maximizer among budget feasible trans-








In this deﬁnition of a monetary equilibrium buying and selling prices
are expressed in terms of the unit of account. Thus, whenever equilibrium
prices p ∈ R2  exist, the value of money must be positive. One may note
that in seeking candidate equilibrium prices of commodities they cannot be
constrained to lie in a compact subset of R2  unless the value of money
which might fall to zero is explicitly introduced. It is to be noted that the
free disposability of commodities is not assumed so that some of the prices
may be negative at equilibrium.
Let us give a statement of a property concerning the preference distri-
bution of an economy which will be needed as a condition of the theorem
below.
[Possibility of Individual Utility Enhancement for Feasible Allo-
cations] There is a positive number k∗ such that for any given








5and for any commodity j,( 1≤ j ≤  ), there is some agent
i ∈{ 1,...,m} with a consumption vector 0 ≤ y ≤ k∗ m
i=1ei
satisfying
(i) yh = xCh
i for all h  = j,
(ii) y  i xC
i .
Take any one commodity j.I fi ti sdistributed freely among agents exhaust-
ing all of the resource, then, it should be the case that some one prefers to
reduce or increase (within some uniform bound) his/her consumption of the
commodity. If there is at least one agent who consumes and regards the
commodity j to be desirable (i.e., a “good”) or undesirable (i.e., a “bad”) in
all the range of feasible consumptions, this condition is automatically satis-
ﬁed. Thus, it is immediate that if all the agents have monotone preferences,
the above property is satisﬁed. Note that it does not rule out some of the
commodities to be bads or some of the commodities to become undesirable
beyond some levels of their consumption as long as all the agents do not
reach their satiation level of a particular commodity simultaneously.
The only case of preference distribution which is ruled out by this con-
dition is the following: There is a commodity j that is regarded desirable
only up to some positive consumption levels by all agents, and the sum of
the “satiation levels” of the commodity, beyond which an increase of its con-
sumption by agents become undesirable just happens to be exactly equal to
the total endowment of the commodity j in the economy. This condition
is of a “generic” nature in the sense that even if a particular economy does
not satisfy the condition, a slight perturbation of agents’ preferences or total
endowments will make the condition satisﬁed.
THEOREM Let ( i,e i,M i)i=1,...,m be an economy with
 m
i=1ei > 0 and
M =
 m
i=1Mi > 0 satisfying the property of the possibility of individual
utility enhancement for feasible allocations. Then, there is a monetary equi-
librium ((x1,...,x m),p) for the economy provided that the transaction al-
location (0,...,0) inducing the initial endowments consumption allocation
(e1,...,e m) is not Pareto optimal.
3 Discussion and Some Remarks
A basic scenario supporting the formulation of the model described in the
previous section is essentially the same as the one given in Duﬃe (1990)
6except for the explicit statement of transactions costs in terms of individual
transaction possibility sets in case of Duﬃe.
A market authority is organized and performs the operation of exchanging
  commodities for money at each point in time for a ﬁnite duration. The
model describes the terminal period only. The market authority plays the
role of a “central banker” and collects money at the time of transactions.
Fiat money need not be paper currency but could take the form of “electro-
money” in the sense that it is composed of accounts held by traders at the
central bank with debits and credits done by electronic devices. Overdrafts
are not permitted and we require non-negative balances of money by traders.
Aside from the fact that money being the unit of account, a basic role of
money in the model is transactional one at the terminal period. Although
it is implicit, money also plays the role of a store of value carried over to
the terminal period from the implicit previous time periods in the form of
outside money balance.
The theorem asserts that if traders take buying and selling prices of com-
modities in markets as given, then there is a competitive market equilibrium
with a positive monetary value even if no transaction costs are required pro-
vided that traders are better oﬀ with trades than without trades. This result
conﬁrms the conjecture of Duﬃe that his theorem establishing the existence
of monetary equilibrium may obtain without transactions costs (see Duﬃe
(1990, Theorem 1, p.87, and the second paragraph in p.92)).
Let us brieﬂy indicate the nature of buying and selling prices of com-
modities and the value of money at equilibrium that are given in the proof
of the theorem. In our search for equilibrium buying and selling prices and
the value of money we normalize buying prices pB to the unit ball B  in R 
and express selling prices pS and value of money pM relative to pB. The
concept of volume of trades is introduced as in Duﬃe (1990) to determine
selling prices. The volume of trades v associated with a transaction vec-
tor xi =( xB
i ,x S
i ) ∈ R2 
+ is deﬁned as the vector composed of the maximum














with the maximum taken coordinatewise. At equilibrium we have
 m
i=1xB
i =  m
i=1xS
i = v.
Given volume of trade v ∈ R 
+, selling prices pS associated with buying






for j =1 ,..., . The bid-ask spread of commodity j is then δj(pB,v)pBj.I n
other words, the selling price pSj of commodity j is given by (1−δj(pB,v))pBj.
The absolute value of bid-ask spread factor of a commodity is strictly less
than one, and it is monotonic in volumes of trades of that commodity. One
might feel that the latter property is somewhat counter to what one might
expect as a property of bid-ask spreads. Note, however, that the spirit of bid-
ask spreads in the present model is that they originate in transactions costs
which certainly accumulate as volumes of trades increase. Bid-ask spreads
are designed so that a positive buying price commands a positive spread and
a negative price a negative spread. This means that for desired commodities
buyers pay more than sellers receive, and for undesired commodities, in order
to have them disposed, sellers pay more than buyers receive.
During the course of the existence proof in Section 4, given buying prices
pB, selling prices pS are determined according to bid-ask spreads given in
the previous paragraph. The value pM of money is set so that the value
of existing stock of outside money is exactly equal to the total sum of the
bid-ask spreads resulting from the volume v of trades in markets. It means
that agents use outside money to ﬁnance the excess of their payments over
receipts in order to clear the results of their transactions with the market
authority in commodity markets.
By the hypothesis of the theorem the initial endowments allocation is not
Pareto optimal. Thus, agents do wish to engage in trades provided bid-ask
spreads are suﬃciently small. Bid-ask spreads introduced above have the
property that they can be made arbitrarily small in neighborhoods of the
initial endowments allocation. It therefore follows that there will be a positive
volume of trades at equilibria. By the way value of money is determined in
our model, a positive volume of trades induces a positive terminal value of
money.
Nevertheless, the theorem may at ﬁrst seem counterintuitive. Since the
model deals with the terminal period, it must be transaction demands that
give rise to the positivity of monetary value. Market transactions of com-
modities must require costs if they are to motivate transactions demands for
money. Thus, a natural question might arise: Why is it that one can establish
the existence of monetary equilibrium without requiring transactions costs?
8The answer is straightforward. It is because we assumed that agents take
buying and selling prices as given no matter how big bid-ask spreads are. But
agents will in general take advantage of bid-ask spreads unless their arbitrage
transactions are unproﬁtable due to existing transactions costs. Therefore,
the fact that the theorem is true seems to point to the need for strengthening
the equilibrium concept adopted by us and others in the context of a general
equilibrium model with transactions costs. It is implicitly assumed in the
literature ( see, e.g., Foley (1970) and Duﬃe (1990, p.90) ) that transactions
costs are severe enough to prevent arbitrage over bid-ask spreads. What need
to be done thus seems to be to require explicitly bid-ask spreads of prices be
arbitrage free in the sense that arbitrage transactions are not proﬁtable vis-
` a-vis transactions costs incurred by such activity. It would lead to rethinking
of the formulation of the model with individual transactions technologies.
We would like to note that writers such as Lerner (1947), Hahn (1971),
Starr (1974), Heller (1974), and others have either simply forced agents to de-
mand ﬁat money at the terminal period or motivated such holdings requiring
the payment of exogenously given lump sum taxes. In this context we could
regard bid-ask spreads of prices in the present model as endogenous indirect
taxes by the authority. Spread factor δj then represents a quantity tax levied
on commodity j. One is thus led to feel that it is natural to have existence of
a monetary equilibrium in a framework without explicit transactions costs.
And a conceptual diﬃculty pointed out in the previous paragraph would not
arise in this interpretation.
A ﬁnal remark may be due. The model in this paper does not suggest
why ﬁat money may oﬀer transactional advantages as a medium of exchange,
but given a positive value for money the advantages are not diﬃcult to imag-
ine, considering for instance the work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), and
Ostroy and Starr (1973). Instead the model presented here merely suggests
why outside ﬁat money may have positive value in the ﬁrst place even in a
situation where explicit transactions costs do not exist.
94 Proof of the Theorem
1. Let k∗ be the positive number given in the statement of the property
of diversiﬁed satiation of consumption, and let




For each i =1 ,...,m, deﬁne





where [0, ¯ e]: =
 
z ∈ R | 0 ≤ zj ≤ ¯ ej for all j =1 ,..., 
 
. Let us also deﬁne
X :=
 m
i=1 Xi and V := [0, ¯ e] ⊂ R
 
+.
Xi sthe space of transaction allocations and an element v ∈ V will be called
volume of trades which will be deﬁned later.
B  denotes the unit closed ball in R  centered at the origin 0, and a vector
q in B  will represent buying prices of   commodities. Given buying prices q
and volume of trades v, selling prices are deﬁned via a spread factor δj(q,v),





for each j =1 ,..., . Deﬁne a diagonal matrix Λ(q,v)a sa ×  matrix with
diagonal elements 1 − δj(q,v), j =1 ,..., . Then, the selling price vector
associated with q is set to be given by Λ(q,v)q.T h us, spreads between
buying and selling prices q − Λ(q,v)q is equal to (δ1(q,v)q1,...,δ (q,v)q ).
The spread factor δj(q,v) has the following property:
(i) buying price is greater or less than selling price depending upon whether
it is positive or negative;
(ii) non-zero buying and selling prices are identical if and only if there are
no trades in the markets, i.e., vj =0 ;
(iii) |δj(q,v)| is increasing in vj and 0 ≤| δj(q,v)| < 1.
10It follows from (1) that for each j =1 ,..., we have
δ
j(q,v)q




j > 0i f and only if q
jv
j  =0 . (3)
Given a vector q ∈ B  of buying prices, the following notation will be
used to denote the vector of buying prices and reverse-signed selling prices:
q(v): =( q,−Λ(q,v)q) ∈ R












M] ⊂ R+. (6)
pM ∈ ∆M will be the value of money. bM is an upper bound for pM.I nour
proof here buying prices are “normalized” to the unit closed ball, and selling
prices and the value of money are expressed relative to buying prices.
2. We now deﬁne correspondences βi,ϕ i,µ i. Let (x,v,q,pM) ∈ X ×




zi ∈ Xi| q(v) · zi ≤ p












zi ∈ Xi | z
C








¯ q ∈ B
  | ¯ q(v) · [
 m
i=1xi − (v,−v)] ,























βi and ϕi, i =1 ,...,m, are budget and preference correspondences con-
strained to Xi =[ 0 , ¯ e]. The correspondence µm+2 deﬁnes the volume of
11trades. µm+3 sets the value of money so that the total value of money bal-
ance is exactly equal to the amount of money needed to pay for the diﬀerence
between buying and selling values of commodities in carrying out total trades.
ϕm+1 sets the buying prices (and hence the selling prices) of commodities in
such a way that the value of total excess demand for money in the economy
is maximized. (Let us recall that ¯ q(v)i nthe deﬁnition of ϕm+1 is deﬁned as
in the equation (4) with q replaced by ¯ q. Keep in mind that this convention
is used again when we write q∗(v∗) and q(v∗)i n(10) that are deﬁned as in
(4) with q and/or v replaced by q∗ and/or v∗.)
3. A slightly modiﬁed version of an abstract equilibrium existence
theorem due to Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975) will be applied to the correspon-
dences introduced above.
Given non-empty ﬁnite sets N1 and N2,apair {(Zi,ϕ i,β i)i∈N1,( Zi,µ i)i∈N2}
composed of a family of ordered triples and a family of ordered pairs, where
ϕi : Z → Zi,β i : Z → Zi, and µi : Z → Zi are correspondences with
Z =
 
i∈N1∪N2 Zi,i scalled a bisectoral social system.A nequilibrium for the
bisectoral social system is an x ∈ Z satisfying xi ∈ βi(x), ϕi(x) ∩ βi(x)=∅
for all i ∈ N1, and xi ∈ µi(x) for all i ∈ N2.
Equilibrium Existence Lemma: If, for every i ∈ N1 ∪ N2,
the set Zi is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a Euclidean
space, ϕi is an open graph correspondence from Z to Zi such that
for every z ∈ Z,zi / ∈ co ϕi(z), and βi and µi are non-empty and
convex-valued correspondences from Z to Zi where βi’s are con-
tinuous and µi’s are upper hemi-continuous, then the bisectoral
social system {(Zi,ϕ i,β i)i∈N1,(Zi,µ i)i∈N2} has an equilibrium.
The lemma follows from the proof of a theorem in Shafer-Sonnenschein
(1975). We shall show later that βi,ϕ i,µ i correspondences introduced in
the previous step satisfy all the conditions of the above lemma. Thus, by
applying the equilibrium existence lemma to the bisectoral social system
deﬁned by βi, ϕi (i =1 ,...,m+1 )and µi (i = m +2 ,m+ 3), one obtains




















































4. Let us proceed to show the feasibility of the transaction allocation
x∗ =( x∗
1,...,x ∗


















i , then we must have (
 
ix∗B
i −v∗)  =0o r(
 
ix∗S
i −v∗)  =0 .



























which contradicts the above strict inequality. This establishes (14).






∗MMi +1−  q
∗  for i =1 ,...,m. (15)












i=1ei < ¯ e for any i =1 ,...,m. (17)
13Thus, if we had q∗(v∗) · x∗
i <p ∗MMi +1−  q∗  for some i, then by the
local nonsatiation of preferences we would obtain ϕi(ξ∗) ∩ βi(ξ∗)  = ∅, which
contradicts (11).
It now follows from (13), (14), and (15) that
  q
∗  =1 . (18)
In addition to (18) one can prove
q
∗j  =0 for every j =1 ,..., . (19)
Indeed, assume we had q∗h =0for some 1 ≤ h ≤  .I tfollows from (17) and
the property of the possibility of individual utility enhancement for feasible
allocations that for some agent i there is a consumption vector y ∈ R 
+
such that yj = x
∗Cj
i for all j  = h and y  i x∗C
i . Put zB =( y − ei)+ and
zS =( y − ei)− where for any t ∈ R , t+ := max{t,0} and t− := max{−t,0}
with the maximum taken coordinatewise. Write z =( zB,zS). Then, we




i for all j  = h,
zB =( zB − zS)+, and zS =( zB − zS)−.T o c heck z is budget feasible for








i }. Then, since










































































where the last inequality follows from the property of δj described by (2).
This shows z is budget feasible for i. Hence, zC  i x∗C
i contradicts (11).
Thus (19) must be true.
5. We now show that
p
∗M > 0. (20)
























Since the transaction allocation (0,0) is not Pareto optimal by the hypothesis




i  i x∗C
i for all i and
 m
i=1xB
i =  m
i=1xS









∗) · xi >p
∗MMi ≥ 0.








> 0 contradicting the feasibility
of the transaction allocation (x1, ..., x m). Therefore, we must have (20).
This argument also establishes
v
∗  =0 . (21)
6. Let ¯ ek := k¯ e for each positive integer k =1 ,2,... and replace ¯ e






k ) satisfying the properties (7)–(21) where ξ∗
is replaced by ξ∗
k.W eshow ξ∗
k, k =1 ,2,..., are bounded. For this purpose





i )=0 for all j =1 ,...,  (22)







i )−, and yi := (yB
i ,yS
i ). Then,
we have 0 ≤ yi ≤ x∗
i and yC
i = x∗C
i . Deﬁne sets, JB and JS,o findices of
commodities as in Step 4. We prove the property (22) by showing yi = x∗
i.
Assume yi  = x∗
i. Then, we must have x
∗Sj
i > 0 for some j ∈ JB or x
∗Bj
i > 0
















































































15Thus, one has q∗(v∗)·yi <p ∗MMi. But since yC
i = x∗C
i ,b y(17) it contradicts
(11) and the local nonsatiation of preferences. This establishes (22).
Now, for every i =1 ,...,m, one has x∗B
i −x∗S
i +ei = x∗C






i ≤ ei ≤
 m
i=1ei . (23)
In view of (22), (23) implies that
0 ≤ x
∗S
i ≤ ei ≤
 m
i=1ei for every i =1 ,...,m. (24)














for every i =1 ,...,m.






k ), k =1 ,2,..., are bounded. Let us denote a limit point
of the sequence ξ∗
k by ξ∗ =( x∗,v∗,q∗,p ∗M) again and assume without loss of
generality that the sequence ξ∗
k itself converges to ξ∗.A s e v ery ξ∗
k satisﬁes
(13), (14), (15) and (18), so does ξ∗. The argument in Step 4 to obtain (19)
also applies to the limit point ξ∗, and hence so does the argument in Step 5
to obtain (20).
Replacing Xi by X∗
i := R 
+ × R 
+, deﬁne β∗
i and ϕ∗
i for each i =1 ,...,m







∗)=∅ for i =1 ,...,m, (26)





k)  = ∅
for k large enough in contradiction to (11) since each xi on the budget hy-
perplane has local cheaper points as to be shown in the last step of our
proof.








p∗M for j =1 ,..., .
16Then, by (14), (15), (18),(20), and (26), ((x∗
1,...,x ∗
m),p ∗)i samonetary equi-
librium. It remains to show that the correspondences βi,ϕ i,µ i introduced
in Step 2 satisfy the conditions of the Equilibrium Existence Lemma.
8. The nonempty-valuedness of βm+1 and µi , i = m +2 ,m+3 ,i s
trivial, and that of βi , i =1 ,...,m, follows from pM ≥ 0, q ∈ β , and
0 ∈ Xi. Note that in the lemma ϕi’s are allowed to be empty-valued. The
upper hemi-continuity of µi , i = m +2 ,m+3 ,and the continuity of βm+1
are immediate. That ϕi has an open graph is straightforward for i = m +1
and is a consequence of the continuity of preferences for i =1 ,...,m. The
upper hemi-continuity of βi , i =1 ,...,m,b eing straightforward, the only
property one needs to show is the lower hemi-continuity of βi , i =1 ,...,m.
For this purpose, it is suﬃcient to prove existence of local cheaper points
for any transaction vector lying on a budget hyperplane. We state it as a
lemma.
Lemma: Given xi ∈ R 
+ × R 
+, q ∈ B , pM ≥ 0, v ∈ R 
+ × R 
+ satisfying
q(v)·xi = pMMi+1− q , there is a sequence {xin}n in Xi such that xin → xi
and q(v) · xin <q (v) · xi for all n.
The lemma is an immediate consequence of the following fact:
Fact: Let p( =0 )∈ Rn and H(p)={z ∈ Rn| p · z =0 }.I f one has
H(p) ∩ Rn
++ = ∅, then p ∈ Rn
+ ∪ Rn
−.
Let p  =0and H(p) ∩ Rn
++ = ∅. Let J+ = {j| pj > 0}, J0 = {j| pj =0 },
and J− = {j| pj < 0}.I f the conclusion of the lemma were false, then one
would have p/ ∈ Rn
+ ∪Rn







1 for j ∈ J0
1
pj for j ∈ J+
−
#J+
(#J−)pj for j ∈ J−
where # indicates the number of elements in a set. Then, x ∈ Rn
++ and
p · x =0 ,i.e., x ∈ H(p), contradicting H(p) ∩ Rn
++ = ∅. This proves the
above fact.
Let xi,q,p M, and v begiven as in the lemma. Since q(v)=( q,−Λ(q,v)q) / ∈
R2 
+ ∪ R2 
−,b yapplying the above fact to the hyperplane H (q(v)) ⊂ R2 , one
17obtains yi ∈ R2 
++ such that q(v)·yi < 0. By shortening the length of the vec-
tor yi if necessary, one can assume w.1.o.g. yi ∈ Xi.N o w ,for each i =1 ,2,...
deﬁne xin := xi +
1
n(yi−xi) ∈ Xi. Then, one has q(v)·xin <p MMi +1− q 
and xin → xi.
This establishes the lemma and completes the proof of the theorem. 
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